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DD/IC GREEN.

5 October 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

**SUBJECT: Lunch with Dr. Albert D. Wheelon,
Wednesday, 3 October 1962**

1. I told Bud Wheelon that I just wanted to have a brief fill-in on how things were going and what was going on in OSI. I mentioned that apparently the Director was still not sold on the organizational structure we had and still felt that all of our scientific and technical people should be in one organization rather than scattered.

2. Wheelon mentioned that a couple of weeks ago General Doolittle had called him and said that he would like to have an informal chat with him. He said that he had cleared this with Cline who had told him to go ahead and talk with Doolittle just so long as he made it clear that his views were his own and not those of the Agency. Wheelon told Doolittle that he had come into the Agency to do a job and that while at first he had had some misgivings as to whether or not he could do it, he was now confident that he could. He said he told the General that he was not sure, after four or five years if he did the job properly, whether he would be able to continue to make a career in the Agency because of the number of people that he might have to annoy or offend in order to do the job properly. He said that as far as the organizational structure of the location of OSI in the Agency was concerned, he had told General Doolittle that OSI could be located either under DD/I or under DD/R, and that this was a matter he had left up to Kirkpatrick.

3. He then turned to a discussion of where OSI should be located and said he felt that at the present time it was more logical to have it under DD/I, but that if DD/R should get [redacted] then it would be more logical for it to be in DD/R. He said he had mentioned to Scoville that he thought these organizations should be in DD/R but that he could not seem to stimulate much interest on Scoville's part. [redacted] organization with about [redacted] at [redacted] the [redacted] danger that NRO might get too big a slice of the cake to the detriment of CIA.

4. He then discussed his relations with the DD/I and commented on what a brilliant and energetic fellow Cline is. He noted that he was in many respects like Amory and that his interests were far more in the current

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intelligence field than in the scientific field. He noted that Cline at one point had chided him on reports that he was a bit irascible, and that he and Cline were now having regular meetings to talk about what was going on in OSI. He noted just one disagreement with OCI over the item in the Bulletin




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5. Wheelon then went into a fairly lengthy review of what he had been doing in OSI since taking over and made the following points:

a. He has been devoting a lot of time to personnel matters, and he and his senior officers plan to go out to the colleges and universities this fall on a recruitment drive. He noted that he was getting a Magna Cum Laude Doctor from Harvard for his Medical Division.

b. He has told his senior supervisors to devote at least 30% of their time to personnel matters and to be sure to really get to know their people.

c. He feels that the time will come when he will have to get rid of some people and is concerned about this. We discussed briefly  program and I told him that I didn't think it should inhibit him because I was sure, on the basis of careful selection, that people could be eased out of the Agency when they fell below our standard of performance.

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d. He said he had eliminated the annual production program because it didn't make any sense and really established a basis of producing intelligence simply to produce something. In its stead he now meets monthly with the division chiefs and they go over what they are working on, dropping those items which either cannot be produced or on which they don't have the capability. He said he was building a warehouse of material of interest to the top policy level in the Government, and that he was trying to produce it in such a fashion that it would be of interest to them and attract their attention.

e. In this connection he said they were doing everything they could to stimulate the analysts to write better and to write as they wanted to. He had reassured them that the Publications Staff was not there to simply tear up their material, and that they could be as technical and detailed as they wished in their reports just so the conclusions were clear and understandable to the non-technical individual. He said they were even planning to allow the analysts to put their names on reports.

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f. He then talked about grades and the fact that the office had been set up on a basis that the analyst could not aspire to a senior grade unless he became a supervisor or administrator. I told him that this was fallacious and that there was no reason why a top flight analyst couldn't have a top grade, including a supergrade. He said they planned to make full use of Public Law 313.

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g. He mentioned that he had held a three-day conference at [] with all of his division and staff chiefs so that they could review in complete seclusion what they were doing and how they should do it. He said he had invited Cline to this meeting and was delighted that he came and made an excellent presentation on what was expected of them, noting that we were all first generation intelligence officers and that it was only understandable that there might be a lack of clarity as to what was wanted.

h. He said that by the end of the year he thought he would be ready to review with Cline how he was doing and whether Cline was satisfied with him, and to determine whether OSI was properly structured in DD/I. He noted that he had not been able to devote much time to estimates as yet except where he had inevitably been drawn into the discussions.

(S)
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
Executive Director

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